The Warren Court was the apex of liberal legalism in America, embodying hopes that courts could play a leading role in social change. It has thus been an inspiration to judges and activists around the world. This paper traces the influence of the Warren Court in East Asia, focusing on three countries, Korea, Taiwan and Japan. Because of the Japanese colonial legacy, these three countries share certain institutional structures and basic orientations of the legal system, providing a useful context for a comparative analysis. The paper first traces the impact of Warren Court jurisprudence in each country in particular doctrinal areas, especially criminal procedure and reapportionment. It then goes on to consider the factors that account for differential levels and modes of impact in different contexts as a way of drawing comparative conclusions about the conditions for transnational judicial influence. It argues that institutional structure, as well as political forces, is the crucial determinant of whether ideas from abroad can become effective legal transfers.
4 criminal procedure, 9 the Warren Court frequently anticipated social change rather than followed it. This amounted to what Abe Fortas, and many others, called a judicial revolution.
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In considering the extent to which this activity influenced courts in East Asia, we must at the outset consider in the abstract what constitutes the influence of a Court. This is a surprisingly complex question. Let us consider four levels at which a court can be said to have influence, each reflected in different evidence: citation, doctrine, judicial style, and extrajudicial actors.
A. Influence by Citation
In recent years, it has become fashionable to refer to the growing willingness of courts to look at practice of other courts beyond the borders as a transnational judicial dialogue. 11 Anne
Marie Slaughter has been especially active in documenting this phenomenon and argued that it constitutes a new form of global governance. 12 Adherents of this view celebrate the normative attractiveness of this "dialogue." Slaughter, for example, has encouraged the United States Supreme Court to follow constitutional justices around the world in being willing to look to foreign decisions as persuasive authority when considering the content of particular human rights norms.
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This is what might be called influence by citation. The evidence for this global dialogue is found in the allegedly increased propensity of courts to cite foreign decisions. Citation, however, is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for influence. It is not necessary because a court can adopt a rule or line of reasoning from a foreign court without citing it. It is not sufficient because many decisions that are cited are distinguished and not followed. Moreover, the fact that citation in written opinions is not a universal practice, even among constitutional courts, means that this measure of influence will tend to overweight the European Court of 
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Justice, the U.S. Supreme Court, the German Constitutional Court, and the European Court of Human Rights as sources and targets of influence. Influence by citation is hardly a workable method for evaluating the impact of external ideas on East Asian courts, because courts in the region are not used to citing cases as extensively as their American counterparts.
B. Influence of Doctrine
A second way one might observe influence is doctrinal, tracing the adoption of specific rules created or identified by the Court. If a Court is associated with a particular rule or decision, then the subsequent adoption of that rule by other courts would demonstrate "influence." This method is promising, though evidentiary and causal issues remain. First, one can have coincidental adoption of similar rules. Second, one can have two decisions by different courts both influenced by a third, prior decision. The term "influence" implies causality at a fairly strong level, probably more than can be justified in as broad a social field as the legal system.
C. Influence on Judicial Style
A third way in which one might evaluate influence is in the style of decision-making.
The Warren court may be, in the popular conception, the paradigm of an activist court.
14 Regardless of its influence on doctrine in any particular context, the Warren court has redefined what it means to be a court, and the role of courts in bringing about social change. From this point of view, the Warren Court"s greatest influence will be as an idea.
Note that in characterizing this influence as a matter of judicial style, I am implicitly assuming that judges and courts have some choice in articulating the judicial role vis-à-vis other political actors. Judges, and courts, can through their decision-making decide to support or to confront legislative and executive authorities. Each case presents an opportunity to position the court in the political system. The net effect of these decisions will determine the reputation of the court, as well as its overall effectiveness.
D. Influence on Extrajudicial Actors
The discussion of judicial style leads one naturally to consider a fourth mode of influence, the influence of a court and its doctrine on non-judicial actors. For Warren Court jurisprudence has been extraordinarily influential on academics and activists in many countries, 14 Note that Rehnquist court has struck as many or more laws, despite its reputation as being non-activist.
6 regardless of whether these groups are able to successfully introduce the jurisprudence into the courts or legislature. One might characterize this as the influence of the Warren Court on legal or constitutional culture, broadly speaking.
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These various levels of influence bear no logical or structural connection. One can have influence on doctrine without influence on judicial style or extrajudicial actors. Conversely, a court might demonstrate great creativity and social activism, inspired by the Warren court model, in doctrinal areas where the Warren court was relatively silent. It will be important, in the analysis to follow, to ensure that we keep these various strands of influence separate.
II. The Warren Court in East Asia
A. Equality Doctrine
Minority Groups
The paradigm of the Warren Court is, of course, Brown, and its progeny, in which the Court overturned a caste system through a series of decisions. Despite official ideology to the contrary, no society in Northeast Asia is ethnically homogenous. All societies in the region are becoming, in fact, more diverse because of low population growth and the need to import labor to perform the dirty, dull and dangerous tasks that increasingly affluent citizens are reluctant to perform. 16 In each society, minority groups have established political movements, but none have used litigation as the primary means of social change.
In Japan, descendants of Korean laborers are considered permanent aliens, not subject to full constitutional protections accorded citizens. 17 Over time, many of these discriminatory 7 provisions have been dismantled, for example, the mandatory fingerprinting, the requirement of adopting Japanese names, and the provision of health insurance. Yet the mechanisms by which these changes have occurred has primarily been political pressure and administrative revision, rather than judicially imposed adjustment ala Brown. And the norms by which the disadvantaged groups have articulated demands for change have been, primarily international, rather than based primarily on Warren Court cases. Thus we see little influence of the Court on any level, either in style or doctrine.
Similarly, in the case of the Buraku minority, a historically-based caste in Japan, Article 14 of the Japanese Constitution would seem to prohibit discrimination on the basis of family origin, and one might therefore expect a strategy of litigation-based social change. The strategy pursued by the activist leadership of this underclass, however, has been to use instrumental violence rather than to use litigation. 18 The consequence of this strategy has been one of groupbased affirmative action, but there are no laws to deal with individualized discrimination against buraku, and it does not appear that social discrimination is illegal in any sense.
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In Korea as well, usually considered one of the most ethnically homogenous nations on earth, there is substantial class and regional discrimination. Some have recently called for U.S.-style equal protection for Koreans of disfavored classes. 20 Yet for the most part, calls for equality have not emerged through litigation. While Korea features a number of nongovernmental activist organizations, some of which are explicitly focused on pursuing justice through the courts, in practice most of the effective gains of these groups have been achieved outside the courts. This has been the case, for example, with efforts to ensure protection for the migrant workers.
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Taiwanese ethnicity is more complex yet again. Taiwan is populated by a small aboriginal majority; a larger "indigenous" Taiwanese population; and a group of "mainlanders" 8 namely persons who retreated to Taiwan along with Chiang Kai-shek in the later 1940s and their descendant. The mainlander group dominated politics until recent democratization beginning in the late 1980s. At the same time, these ethnic distinctions may be losing their salience since the Taiwan-born percentage is increasing. Although these "ethnic" divisions have been an explicit basis of politics, the issue has not been so much discrimination that could be addressed through the courts, so much as political representation that was eventually delivered through the political process. Still, at no time were equality concerns prominent in official Taiwan discourse.
In short, the Warren court jurisprudence on minority groups has not had much doctrinal, stylistic or cultural influence, in East Asia. This is not so much because of the celebrated ethnic homogeneity of the region so much as that courts have either been unavailable or unutilized as vehicles for social change in this area.
Elections
Among These issues were very much alive in East Asia in the postwar period. In Japan, Korea, and Taiwan, land reforms had been designed to provide a strong rural base for the economy. Yet all had enjoyed rapid economic development and consequent urbanization. This left a situation in which the countryside was over-represented in legislative institutions, a situation which suited the conservative majorities perfectly fine. But as in Baker, it became apparent that the political process on its own could not correct the imbalances caused by demographic change.
a. Japan
Two out of the handful of Japanese Supreme Court decisions holding legislative acts unconstitutional concern elections. These two decisions were made possible by a 1964 ruling by the Supreme Court in the Koshiyama case that rejected an equality-based argument for challenging malapportionement. 26 In this early case, there was a 4 to 1 ratio of malapportionment between rural and city residents, itself a legacy of the fact that voting districts were established when Japan was mainly agricultural. The facts thus closely paralleled Baker.
The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) had a strong base in the countryside, and preferred the malapportionment. While the Koshiyama court rejected the appeal and adopted language of deference to the Diet as the political body best able to balance competing considerations, it was significant that the case had been allowed to come forward under the auspices of Article 204 of the Public Officials Election Act.
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In a separate opinion, Justice Kitaro Saito took issue with the decision"s suggestion that where extreme inequality resulted, there might be a judicial remedy. Saito quoted extensively from Justice Frankfurter"s dissenting opinion in Baker, in which he reiterated the view he had expressed in Colegrave that some problems were simply no amenable to judicial resolution. JAPAN, 1961 JAPAN, -1970 JAPAN, , 53, 54 (1978 .
arguing that it would better serve the Court"s legitimacy were it to do so. 28 We thus see the direct influence, by citation, of a dissenting opinion from the Warren Court
In 1976 the question of the constitutionality of malapportionment was again an issue before the Court in Kurokawa v. Chiba. 29 In an election for the House of Representatives, the Grand bench looked at the disparity in the malapportionment, which amounted to nearly 5 to 1 in the Chiba district in question, and decided that it constituted an unreasonable level of malapportionment proportion. In its decision the court asserted that "voting is a historically significant popular political struggle and equal protection under the constitution was aimed at equal voting rights." The Court however refused to set a precise allowable ratio for future cases, nor did it void the contested election in question. Again, a dissenting opinion distinguished United States cases, focusing on institutional distinctions between Japan and the United States that rendered the circumstances different in Japan.
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The Kurokawa decision strongly implied that the Diet should correct the malapportionment, but by most accounts it failed to do so. This became an issue in 1986, in
Kanao v. Hiroshima. 31 The Diet had not made any changes to the ratio since the Kurokawa decision, and the question of a 4 to 1 ratio was again discussed. This time the court looked at two questions: first, had there been a reasonable time for the Diet to make changes in the ratio? And second, was the ratio reasonably within the Diet"s discretionary power?
Because it had been eight years, the court reached the conclusion that the Diet had had sufficient time to revise the system. Still, the Court declined to establish a specific level to be deemed reasonable. Furthermore, as in the Kurokawa case, the election was not invalidated. This gave rise to the possibility of "circumstance decision," which allowed the election to stand, even if the election rules were held unconstitutional. that the court is hesitant to order the Diet to act. Rather, the Court has preferred to set loose standards for the Diet to follow and wait for cases to be brought. A 1994 Act finally suggested that the revised redistricting plan should achieve a ratio of no more than 2:1 between largest and smallest districts. What was the influence of the Warren court here? Goodman claims that the Japanese litigation followed the U.S. one person, one vote rationale. 32 Institutionally, however, the Court"s approach to the apportionment cases bears more similarity to German rather than American judicial review. The Court"s strong language to the Diet, followed by its subsequent evaluation of whether or not sufficient time was allowed to pass revisions, reminds one of the German system of grades of judicial review. And the Court"s caution in failing to void elections certainly does not remind one of the Warren Court in terms of judicial style. Perhaps the lack of equitable powers, oft-commented on by Professor Haley, is a major consideration in determining the Court"s approach. In the United States, the court has inserted itself deeply into electoral regulation, prompting a predictable rhythm of reapportionment litigation after each census cycle.
In Japan, the Court has tread lightly on the remedial side.
b. Korea
As in Japan, equality jurisprudence has been particularly important outside the context of racial and ethnic minorities. Indeed, Ahn states that as of 1998, the equality provisions are the most frequently used to strike laws. 33 And like both the Japanese Supreme Court and the Warren court, the Korean courts have been very active in using equality jurisprudence in regulating the electoral process to ensure minority representation. The Constitutional Court has played the major role here, For example, a minority party challenged the Local Election Law of 1990, which required large deposits of money from candidates. This provision served as a strong disincentive for minority parties to field candidates. The Court found that the party had standing, and that the provision in question violated the constitutional guarantee of equality. Similarly, in 1989 the Court struck Article 33 of the National Assembly Members Election Act, which required a higher deposit from independent candidates than from those affiliated with a party. In its decision, the 32 GOODMAN, THE RULE OF LAW, at 125.
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Court identified the right to vote and to run for office as core democratic values that could not be granted unequally. 34 In 1992, the Court struck provisions in the same law that provided partybased candidates advantages over independent candidates in campaign appearances and leafletings. The Court found that these provisions limited the Constitution"s guarantees of equality of opportunity and of the right to hold public office. 35 The Court thus rejected a partybased view of democratic governance.
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The Court in 1995 found several provisions of the electoral law to be "nonconforming" because of excessively disproportional representation for rural districts compared with urban ones. As in Japan, Korean districting had been designed to maximize the influence of rural areas at the expense of urban voters, a problem that had been exacerbated by urbanization. Relying in part on Japanese, German and American cases, the Court declared that disproportionality between urban and rural districts would require restructuring districts. 37 It set a ratio of 4:1 as the maximum possible level of disproportionality between the most and least populous districts.
In an instructive contrast with similar cases before the Japanese Supreme Court, the National Assembly amended the election law to conform with the Court"s decision. 
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The issue came up again, some years later, after a redistricting plan adopted by the National Assembly. The Court then held that the ratio should be limited to a 3:1 discrepancy between most and least populous districts, and warned that it would apply a stricter criteria of 2:1 at some date in the future. 39 It held that the election districting scheme was again not in conformity with the Constitution, but allowed it to remain in place through December 2003. The National Assembly is now revising the districting scheme in preparation for elections to be held in 2004.
When compared with the Japanese Supreme Court (which it has cited in its own consideration of the issues) the Korean Constitutional Court has had a relatively successful set of interactions with the legislature in redistricting cases. Ratios of disproportionality are lower in Korea than in Japan, and the National Assembly has quickly complied with its decisions. At the same time, the explicit influence of Baker has been less substantial, as Japanese and German approaches have been the more frequently cited.
c. Taiwan
Election issues in Taiwan have not concerned the one man-one vote principle.
Redistricting in Taiwan, for whatever reason, has been less contentious than in Japan and Korea and has not implicated the Council of Grand Justices to date.
d. Summary
While individual case results have differed, there has been remarkable convergence around the desirability of the one-man one-vote principle articulated by Baker. But all courts in the region, perhaps even more so than Baker, have recognized the need to take other factors into account in drawing district lines. Therefore, the courts have differed in their willingness to articulate bright line rules as to precise levels of disproportionality that is tolerable.
B. Criminal Procedure
While In considering the influence of these monumental decisions on East Asia, it is worth recalling how the Warren court got into the business of constitutionalizing criminal procedure. It is perhaps the conventional wisdom that the Warren court"s primary concern was with race. The criminal justice system was a primary mechanism by which subordination was perpetuated and hence criminal procedure issues are often considered race issues in disguise. 43 It may thus be argued that these issues would be felt less acutely in the more ethnically homogenous environments of Northeast Asia.
Criminal procedure in the United States is typically regulated by state law. working through Congress, which also presented political problems because of Southern congressmen who occupied key veto points, and in any case would raise constitutional questions; or a strategy of using the weapons of the court system by providing constitutional rights. The
Supreme Court was the national actor with the capacity to constitutionalize criminal procedure.
The Warren Court, using case-by-case lawmaking, detailed national rules for pretrial detention, regulation of interrogations, evidence law, and jury selection, formerly areas of state regulation.
It formulated the exclusionary rule and granted a right to counsel. It was in this area that the Warren Court achieved its greatest international influence, in East Asia and beyond.
A. Japan
Perhaps no area illustrates the gap between law on the books and law in action as a comparative study of criminal procedure in Japan and the United States. 44 An American criminal defense attorney reading the Japanese Constitution could be forgiven a sense of familiarity with the expansive series of rights afforded to the criminal defendant. They include a judicial warrant requirement for detention (article 33) and for search and seizure (Article 35), an immediate right to counsel (Articles 34 and 37), a right to speedy and public trial by an independent tribunal (Article 37), a privilege against self-incrimination (Article 38), a proscription against double jeopardy (Article 39), and a right to seek compensation for wrongful arrest (Article 40). These rights were adopted after World War II, along with other aspects of the American adversarial system in the criminal procedure code.
However, the procedural protections contemplated by the American drafters of the Japanese Constitution operate in a very different manner in Japan, in large part because of institutional legacies of the prewar inquisitorial system. The prewar criminal justice system featured a special investigating judge, did not provide for a right to counsel before indictment, and generally did not allow counsel to be present during interrogation of the defendant or witnesses.
While these institutional features have been reduced or eliminated, certain legacies persist today. Perhaps the foremost legacy of the inquisitorial system is the close relationship between the prosecutor and judge. Prosecutors and judges are trained together and share a common orientation. Both operate within institutional structures in which they have strong disincentives to acquit defendants. 45 Even though the nominal orientation of the inquisitorial system is a collective search for the truth by defense counsel, the prosecutor and judge, the Japanese prosecutor has a number of practical advantages. The fact that the prosecutor is not required to
give up exculpatory evidence to the defendant means that Japan has adopted an element of adversaries favorable to prosecutors. 46 The great case of Gideon has not been followed in countries in the civil law tradition, and those of Northeast Asia are no exceptions. Hearsay evidence is allowed, and there is no practical counterpart to the exclusionary rule in which
American judges automatically exclude evidence that is obtained illegally. Although judges in Japan may exclude, they are quite reluctant to do so when the consequence might be that a guilty person will go free, even when the evidence has been obtained illegally. Although a defendant can petition for such evidence, counsel must specify the concrete necessity for its disclosure, difficult to do when not available. This violates an international norm that the accused have access to documents and evidence required to prepare his or her case. Nichibenren report 3.3.D.2. It also denies the defendant the ability to have full evidence on which the detention is based. The Bar has been fighting for full disclosure of all evidence acquired in the investigation upon request by defendant, with the remedy for non-disclosure being dismissal of the case. This proposal would allow the prosecution to fail to disclose if the information was sensitive.
Confessions have long occupied a special place in East Asian criminal justice. In the imperial Chinese tradition, evidentiary concerns and fear of controlling magistrates in far-flung places led to an emphasis on a complex system of appeals. Evidence was written in character and there was a need for confessions. Judicial torture was a central part of the system. 48 The priority of confessions has been maintained in the modern period in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan.
Confessions are called the "King of evidence" in Japan; 49 they are desirable both because they save time and because they insulate the police, prosecution and judiciary from criticism. In short, the Warren Court"s jurisprudence on exclusion of illegally obtained evidence has had little doctrinal impact in Japan. Although the Japanese Court introduced the notion of relative exclusion in Hashimoto, the majority of lower courts have followed Hashimoto in admitting the evidence, and none of the four Supreme Court cases on the issue has excluded evidence.
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Institutionally, the bar is the only effective counterweight to the prosecution, and has for years complained about many aspects of the criminal justice system. The Japanese bar has set up systems in which volunteer attorneys will meet with defendants free of charge, distributing work 66 In addition, the traditionally small size of the bar limits its capacity to provide a true counterweight, and few Japanese lawyers can afford to specialize in criminal defense work.
In short, the formal change in law has not been accompanied by institutional reforms to ensure that the formal rights of the constitution are sufficiently protected. The organization and values of both judges and prosecutors were relatively unaffected by the significant paper reforms in the postwar period. A literalist interpretation of the rights of the criminal suspect have meant that in practice, the Japanese system provides less protections than the American one from which many of the rights were borrowed. In recent years, Japan has undertaken a third great transformation of the legal system, a process less extensive that its Meiji or postwar antecedents but still significant. Beginning in the 1990s, a series of ad-hoc reforms was adopted that has made it easier to sue for shareholders, expanded the size of the bar and streamlined civil procedure. This process has accelerated under the Justice System Reform Council that issued its final report in June 2001. This report recommended a number of fundamental reforms, including the adoption of new graduate law schools which is well under way. Relatively speaking, the most criticized aspects of Japan"s criminal justice process remained insulated from these broader transformations. Calls to provide a system of public defenders, or end the system of daiyo kangoku in which police stations are used for pretrial detention, or, were not incorporated into the final report. . 75 However, some recommendations may have a significant effect. The adoption of a jury system will no doubt make the process more adversarial. Lay participation in judicial decision-making requires certain institutions such as control of the presentation of evidence, which tend to put the parties in a more adversarial relationship. The judge quite naturally becomes more of a referee policing the process than an inquisitor. No doubt the Japanese system will remain its own distinctive hybrid, but there is at least the possibility of greater protection of rights under a jury or quasi-jury system. 24 statist arguments. 76 It is perhaps safe to say, then, that the influence has been greatest outside the formal domain of the law and more on the broader culture of lawyers. The Warren court criminal justice cases provide for those outside the judiciary and prosecution an alternative normative point from which to critique Japanese criminal justice practices.
B. Taiwan
Taiwan has also had a criminal justice system with a great gap between the law on the books and the law in action. Under authoritarian rule, criminal procedure was singularly underdeveloped. This was only partly attributable to the Japanese colonial period, for the harshness of criminal punishment, especially but not exclusively the repression of political crimes, increased in severity under the Kuomintang regime beginning in the 1950s. 77 The basic structure of criminal trials, however, continued to reflect a particular colonial version of the preWar Japanese semi-inquisitorial system. Prosecutors and police were granted wide discretion to summon and interrogate suspects without judicial supervision. Counsel was only allowed to be present in interrogation as late as 1982. For certain "administrative" offenses, police could detain suspects without judicial supervision or review of decision-making. Police could also sentence "vagrants" to work at labor camps without judicial review, a practice originated under Japanese rule and expanded under the KMT. The prosecutors argued that they had quasi-judicial status and served as a "court" for purposes of the required hearing within twenty-four hours of detention. The Council, however, disagreed, rule, applicable at the discretion of the trial judge; a right to remain silent; and a right to have an attorney present during interrogation, drawn directly from Escobedo and Miranda"s influence.
82
Another sign of the shift toward more adversarial procedure, is the introduction of a large number of new rules governing the presentation of evidence at trial, largely modeled on the US Federal Rules of Evidence.
83
In short, the pattern of criminal procedure, and many of its doctrinal features, have been similar to that of the Warren court in the United States. A constitutional court has constitutionalized criminal procedure in an effort to control law enforcement authorities. It has done so, to be sure, in a dialogue with the legislature, encouraging the legislature to revise laws rather than striking them outright. But it has been willing to scrutinize these legislative pronouncements quite strictly, striking the revisions of the vagrant system and the anti-hooligan law. Like the Warren court, the Council of Grand Justices has asserted its primacy in the area of criminal justice. These reforms have increased the doctrinal alignment between the criminal justice system and the normative pronouncements of the Warren Court.
C. Korea
Like Taiwan, the primary influence on Korea public and criminal law has historically been Japanese. 84 Early efforts by the American military government in Korea to de-Japanize the criminal law were unsuccessful, although, as in Japan, constitutional changes to criminal procedure were imposed. 81 Cooney, Arbitrating Reform, at 20. 82 However, none of the countries under review has a system of public appointed attorneys for indigent suspects. Thus the right to have an attorney is still limited in practice. Even beyond these special acts, Korean criminal justice was widely criticized along many of the same lines as that in Japan, but close examination of the institutional structure shows that it was in fact a more extreme case than Japan. Prosecutors served as instruments of political power, and were the dominant actor in the criminal justice process. Judges were less independent than those in Japan, who have maintained a reputation for honesty that is 
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Despite institutional reforms with democratization, many institutional legacies remain.
As in Japan, even the "normal" period of detention can be extended with the approval of judges, and these extension requests are routinely granted. Although, like Japan, Korea has an exclusionary rule of sorts, it has traditionally been discretionary and courts have declined to apply it to evidence seized in illegal search and seizures. Korea has also followed Japan"s wide berth given to police. While in Korea, probable cause is required for warrantless stops, observers assert that in practice Terry-like standards are not observed. 88 Both the Constitution, Article 12 (7) and the Criminal Procedure Code as revised provide for the exclusion of confessions made under torture, threat or deceit.
In part because of these concerns, the 1987 constitution contained a number of provisions suspect of the right to silence before interrogation. The right is based on the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination, and so statements elicited without informing the accused of the right to silence must be excluded.
The Court also made landmark decisions in two National Security Law cases in the 1990s, characterized by one scholar as the Korean version of Massiah. 100 In these cases, the defendants requested an attorney upon detention by National Security Agency officers, but were rejected and subsequently interrogated by prosecutors. The Court excluded the defendant"s statements since they were obtained through a violation of their right to counsel.
The Constitutional Court has also been active in transforming criminal procedure. It has been particularly active in constraining prosecutors, formerly the dominant actor in the criminal justice system. Prosecutorial supremacy was reflected in the criminal procedure code, and the Court struck provisions that a decision of a court to grant bail could be automatically stayed by prosecutorial appeal. 101 The Court then struck article 331 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which provided that defendants could remain in custody in certain cases despite the judgment of innocence by the Court. 102 It later struck other provisions requiring lower court records to be channeled through the prosecutor"s office on their way to higher courts of appeal. 103 The
Constitutional Court has explicitly declared that Korean criminal procedure is now based in the adversary system, with the obvious implication that the Court sits above the prosecution. This is another sign of a shift caused by the constitutional revolution of 1987.
Much like the Warren Court, the Korean Constitutional Court has used broad notions of due process as a fulcrum for making substantive decisions, and has said that "due process is a unique constitutional principle, not limited to the criminal procedure … the principle requires that not only the procedures be described by the law, but the law be reasonable and legitimate in its content." Broadening our lens even further, it is safe to say that the influence of the Warren court has extended beyond the formal law. In Japan, especially, its influence has been greatest on academics and members of the bar who are not the front line authorities who say what the law is.
In Korea and Taiwan, too, close ties to American academia meant that the ideas of the Warren
Court were available as part of the background, long before the political environment would allow its doctrines to be utilized. Whether these more diffuse cultural influences will eventually lead to doctrinal change remains to be seen.
III. Institutional Structures and the Possibility of Influence
What The Japanese Supreme Court has had no such competitive institution that might spur it to become more active. There is some evidence that this dynamic may also allow the Supreme
Court to be more active as well. Virtually every observer of the Japanese Supreme Court characterizes it as a conservative institution, not prone to activism. It remains true that the Japanese Supreme Court has held legislative acts unconstitutional in only a handful of cases in its post-war history. 118 Judicial review has been sporadic in Japan, and by and large these have been in peripheral areas. Now contrast the Warren Court. With justices appointed for life, they had much more freedom to pursue individual and institutional agendas than their short-serving Northeast Asian colleagues. Furthermore, in the aftermath of the New Deal, they did not face a unified dominant disciplined party ala the LDP in Japan. This no doubt made it easier for the judges to exercise independent will. 
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It would be too much to argue that this institutional structure, on its own, bears more than facilitative power in a model of law and societal change. Nevertheless, I argue that institutional openness provides a necessary, if not sufficient, factor in transnational legal change. The story illustrates how a tolerant political environment is crucial for a court to engage in Warren-style activism. Despite is long democratic pedigree, Japan has been governed by a single political party for nearly half a century, with brief interruption. A dominant disciplined party is easily able to constrain activist courts that disagree with its views. Seoul, too, in the late 1960s represented such a politically constrained environment. While we can only speculate on the particular influence of Warren"s remarks on the Korean Supreme Court"s decision to challenge the authorities, the story illustrates how an attempt at activism can lead to grave consequences in an unfriendly political environment.
In Korea and Taiwan in the 1990s, in contrast, the environment was ideal. Political parties are notoriously weak in Korea, and each Korean President since 1987 has had to bear a period of divided government. In Taiwan, a rapid democratization program gave the Council of Grand Justices both the ideological cover and the opportunity to reshape criminal procedure.
Regardless, then, of latent sources of information about the Warren court, the necessary condition for influence was an institutional and political environment that was hospitable.
Conclusion: The Ambiguities of Legal Transfers
In Warren"s 1967 speech he noted that "A Constitution is like a tree. If a tree is transplanted to alien soil and inhospitable climate, it will not grow. Nor will a constitution unless it reflects the culture the history and the innermost desires of a people. There can be no model constitution for the nations of the world. I believe that too often we are all inclined to apprise other systems of government according to whether or not they conform to our own."
A study of the influence of the Warren Court must unavoidably shade into the slippery normative terrain that Warren warns us against. Warren may be right in arguing that doctrinal transfers require domestication to be effective. But at the level of ideas, and of what I have called a judicial style, the Warren court legacy has been an inspiration to judges in Asia. As a beacon of judicial activism, as a source of judicial creativity, and as a provider of justice, the Warren Court will not be paralleled, in Asia or elsewhere.
